Both hierarchical order of abstraction and logical structure are described in the following descriptions of Lectical™ levels 3 through 12. Most of the examples provided in these descriptions (from single representations to single principles) are taken from an analysis of the conceptions of authority and contract associated with complexity levels in several hundred moral judgment interviews scored with the Lectical™ Assessment System (Dawson and Gabrielian, 2003).

At the single sensorimotor actions level, the new schemes are referred to as 1st order sensorimotor schemes. These coordinate 3rd order reflexive actions (the schemes of the previous complexity level). For example, the child can coordinate reaching and grasping in the service of eating, by reaching for, grasping, and taking a bite out of a cookie that is within reach. The most complex logical structure of this complexity level is definitional, linking a single scheme with a concrete goal.

At the sensorimotor mappings level, the new schemes are referred to as 2nd order sensorimotor schemes. These coordinate 1st order sensorimotor schemes. For example, a child may be able to coordinate crawling with the reaching/ grasping/ eating scheme to obtain a cookie by crawling over to her father, who holds out a cookie. The most complex logical structure of this complexity level is linear, linking schemes in a non-arbitrary sequence to achieve a concrete goal.

At the sensorimotor systems level, the new schemes are referred to as 3rd order sensorimotor schemes. These coordinate 2nd order sensorimotor schemes. For example, a child may be able to coordinate the memory of mother taking cookies out of the cookie jar with crawling, climbing, and opening to obtain a cookie that is not in visual range. If verbally advanced, she also may be able to indicate a desire for a cookie by saying 'cookie,' or pointing to the cookie jar—even when there are no cookies in sight. The most complex logical structure of this complexity levels is multivariate, coordinating multiple schemes to achieve a concrete goal.

At the single representations level, the new schemes (henceforth called concepts) are referred to as first order representational sets. These coordinate sensorimotor schemes. In responses to the Joe dilemma (from Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview), for example, the concept of camping coordinates activities like swimming, sleeping in a tent, and painting; the concept of a paper route coordinates activities like riding a bike, delivering papers, and receiving money.

The most complex logical structure of this complexity level is definitional, identifying one aspect of a single representation, as in “Camping is fun,” in which fun is an "aspect" of camp.

At the representational mappings level, the new concepts are referred to as 2nd order representational sets. They coordinate or modify representational sets (the concepts constructed at the single representations level). The very popular 2nd order representational concept of having favorites, for example, can be employed to rank camping and fishing. "Camping is my favorite, and fishing is my next favorite." Concepts like being mean, keeping a promise, changing one’s mind, and sharing also become common at this Lectical™level. "[Joe’s father] is just being mean; he is taking the money away from his kids."

The most complex logical structure of this complexity level is linear, coordinating one aspect of two or more representations—as in, "If you do not do what your father tells you to do, he will get really mad at you"—in which doing what your father says and not doing what your father says are coordinated by his anticipated reaction.

At the representational systems level, the new concepts are 3rd order representational sets. These coordinate elements of representational systems. For example, the concept of trust, articulated for the first time at representational systems, can be used to describe the system of interactions between Joe and his father. "Joe trusted [his Dad] that he could go to the camp if he saved enough money, and then his father just breaks it, and the promise is very important." Concepts like to turn against, to blame, to believe, and being fair are also infrequently observed before this complexity level. "[If you break a promise], they will not like you anymore, and your friends will turn against you."

The most complex logical structure of this complexity level is multivariate, coordinating multiple aspects of two or more representations—as in, "If Joe’s Dad says Joe can go to camp, then he says he can’t go to camp, that’s not fair because Joe worked hard, and then his Dad changed his mind," in which two conflicting representations of Dad’s authority are evaluated in terms of his changed mind and Joe’s hard work.

At the single abstractions level, the new concepts are referred to as 1st order abstractions. These coordinate representational systems. For example, the concept of trustworthiness–articulated for the first time at this Lectical™ level–defines those qualities that make a person trustworthy, rather than describing a particular situation in which trust is felt or not felt. It is composed of qualities that produce trust, such as telling the truth, keeping secrets, and keeping promises. "It's always nice…to be trustworthy. Because, then, if [someone has] a secret, they can come and talk to you." Concepts like kindness, keeping your word, respect, and guilt are also rare before the single abstractions Lectical™ level. "If you don't do something you promise, you'll feel really guilty."

The most complex logical structure of this complexity level identifies one aspect of a single abstraction— as in, "Making a promise is giving your word," in which giving one’s word is an "aspect" of a promise.

The respondent whose response is shown in the figure below describes a system in which promise-keeping is both obligatory and sometimes impossible, “due to unforeseen circumstances.” The reason for keeping promises is that one must stand by one’s commitments. Doing so not only preserves one’s personal integrity, but also builds a sense of trust, “which keeps society functioning.” The notion of standing by one’s commitments, the idea that doing so preserves one’s integrity, the argument that the sense of trust built through promise-keeping keeps society functioning, and the notion of unforeseen circumstances are all examples of 2nd order abstractions. Note how the notion that the trust built from promise keeping keeps society functioning (even in the presence of the effects of unforeseen circumstances) builds on the abstract mappings idea that keeping promises makes it possible for people to depend on one another.

At the abstract mappings level, the new concepts are referred to as 2nd order abstractions. These coordinate or modify abstractions. For example, the 2nd order abstraction, basis, can be employed to coordinate the elements essential to a good relationship. “To me, [trust and respect are] the basis of a relationship, and without them you really don't have one." Concepts like coming to an agreement, making a commitment, building trust, and compromise are also rare before abstract mappings. "I think [Joe and his father] could come to an agreement or compromise that they are both comfortable with."

The most complex logical structure of this complexity level coordinates one aspect of two or more abstractions—as in, "Joe has a right to go to camp, because his father said he could go if he saved up the money, and Joe lived up to his commitment." Here, Joe's fulfillment of his father's conditions determines whether Joe has a right or does not have a right to go to camp.

In the map below, the respondent provides three reasons for keeping promises. There are two mappings in this performance. The first is the assertion that “broken promises can harm relationships because they cause pain and reduce trust.” This mapping coordinates two abstract consequences of promise-breaking into the general notion that broken promises do harm to relationships. The second is the assertion that keeping promises makes it possible for people to “depend on one another.” This mapping coordinates the perspectives of at least two individuals to form the notion that keeping promises produces mutual benefits. Note how this idea builds on the single abstractions notion that people will trust you if you keep promises.

At the abstract systems level, the new concepts are referred to as 3rd order abstractions. These coordinate elements of abstract systems. For example, the concept of personal integrity, which is rare before abstract systems, refers to the coordination of and adherence to notions of fairness, trustworthiness, honesty, preservation of the golden rule, etc., in one’s actions. "[You should keep your word] for your own integrity. For your own self-worth, really. Just to always be the kind of person that you would want to be dealing with." Concepts like verbal contract, moral commitment, functional, development, social structure, and foundation are also uncommon before abstract systems. "A promise is the verbal contract, the moral commitment that the father made to his son. It is the only way for the child to…develop his moral thinking—from watching his parent's moral attitude."

The most complex logical structure of this complexity level coordinates multiple aspects of two or more abstractions. "Following through with his commitment and actually experiencing camp combine to promote Joe’s growth and development, not just physically, but psychologically, emotionally, and spiritually." Here, multiple facets of Joe’s personal development are promoted when he both keeps his commitment and accomplishes his goal.

The respondent whose response is shown in the figure below describes a system in which promise-keeping is both obligatory and sometimes impossible, “due to unforeseen circumstances.” The reason for keeping promises is that one must stand by one’s commitments. Doing so not only preserves one’s personal integrity, but also builds a sense of trust, “which keeps society functioning.” The notion of standing by one’s commitments, the idea that doing so preserves one’s integrity, the argument that the sense of trust built through promise-keeping keeps society functioning, and the notion of unforeseen circumstances are all examples of 2nd order abstractions. Note how the notion that the trust built from promise keeping keeps society functioning (even in the presence of the effects of unforeseen circumstances) builds on the abstract mappings idea that keeping promises makes it possible for people to depend on one another.

At the single principles level, the new concepts are referred to as first order principles. These coordinate abstract systems. The notion of the social contract, for example, results from the coordination of human interests (where individual human beings are treated as systems). "Everybody wants to be treated equally and have a sense of fair play. Because this is so, we have an obligation to one another to enter into a social contract that optimizes equality and fairness." Concepts like autonomy, fair play, heteronomy, higher order principle, and philosophical principle are rare before the single principles Lectical™ level. "The only time we’re justified in breaking the social contract is when a higher principle, such as the right to life, intervenes."

The most complex logical structure of this complexity level identifies one aspect of a principle or axiom coordinating systems—as in, "Contracts are articulations of a unique human quality, mutual trust, which coordinates human relations." Here, contracts are seen as the instantiation of a broader principle coordinating human interactions.

In the map below, mutual trust is employed as a single principle supporting an argument for keeping promises. The rationale for employing this principle is that most social conventions and all moral principles are based on trust. Both all moral principles and most social conventions are 3rd order abstractions. Note how this single principles argument builds on the abstract systems notion that trust keeps society functioning.